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IS LEIBNIZIAN CALCULUS EMBEDDABLE IN FIRST
ORDER LOGIC?
PIOTR B LASZCZYK, VLADIMIR KANOVEI, KARIN U. KATZ, MIKHAIL G.
KATZ, TARAS KUDRYK, THOMAS MORMANN, AND DAVID SHERRY
Abstract. To explore the extent of embeddability of Leibnizian
infinitesimal calculus in first-order logic (FOL) and modern frame-
works, we propose to set aside ontological issues and focus on pro-
cedural questions. This would enable an account of Leibnizian
procedures in a framework limited to FOL with a small number of
additional ingredients such as the relation of infinite proximity. If,
as we argue here, first order logic is indeed suitable for developing
modern proxies for the inferential moves found in Leibnizian infin-
itesimal calculus, then modern infinitesimal frameworks are more
appropriate to interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than
modern Weierstrassian ones.
Keywords: First order logic; infinitesimal calculus; ontology;
procedures; Leibniz; Weierstrass; Abraham Robinson
Contents
1. Introduction 2
2. Examples from Leibniz 2
2.1. Series presentation of π/4 2
2.2. Leibniz convergence criterion for alternating series 3
2.3. Product rule 3
2.4. Law of continuity 4
2.5. Non-examples: EVT and IVT 5
3. What does “first-order” mean exactly? 5
4. Modern frameworks 7
5. Separating entities from procedures 10
6. A lid on ontology 11
7. Robinson, Cassirer, Nelson 12
7.1. Robinson on second-order logic 12
7.2. Ernst Cassirer 14
7.3. Edward Nelson 14
7.4. Not standalone 16
8. Conclusion 16
Acknowledgments 17
1
2 P.B., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. K., T. M., AND D. S.
References 17
1. Introduction
Leibniz famously denied that infinite aggregates can be viewed as
wholes, on the grounds that they would lead to a violation of the prin-
ciple that the whole is greater than the part. Yet the infinitary idea
is latent in Leibniz in the form of a distinction between assignable
and inassignable quantities [Child 1920, p. 153], and explicit in his
comments as to the violation of Definition V.4 of Euclid’s Elements
[Leibniz 1695b, p. 322]. This definition is closely related to what is
known since [Stolz 1883] as the Archimedean property, and was trans-
lated by Barrow in 1660 as follows:
Those numbers are said to have a ratio betwixt them,
which being multiplied may exceed one the other [Euclid 1660].
Furthermore, Leibniz produced a number of results in infinitesimal
calculus which, nowadays, are expressed most naturally by means of
quantifiers that range over infinite aggregates. This tension leads us to
examine a possible relationship between Leibnizian infinitesimal calcu-
lus and a modern logical system known as first order logic (FOL). The
precise meaning of the term is clarified in Section 3. We first analyze
several Leibnizian examples in Section 2.
This text continues a program of re-evaluation of the history of infini-
tesimal mathematics initiated in [Katz & Katz 2012], [Bair et al. 2013]
and elsewhere.
2. Examples from Leibniz
Let us examine some typical examples from Leibniz’s infinitesimal
calculus so as to gauge their relationship to FOL.
2.1. Series presentation of π/4. In his De vera proportione (1682),
Leibniz represented pi
4
in terms of the infinite series
1− 1
3
+
1
5
− 1
7
+ . . .
This is a remarkable result, but we wish to view it as a result concern-
ing a specific real number, i.e., a single case, and in this sense involving
no quantification, once we add a new function symbol for a black box
procedure  called “evaluation of convergent series” (as well as a defi-
nition of π) (we will say a few words about the various implementations
of  in modern frameworks in Section 4).
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2.2. Leibniz convergence criterion for alternating series. This
refers to an arbitrary alternating series defined by an alternating se-
quence with terms of decreasing absolute value tending to zero, such
as the series of Subsection 2.1, or the series
∑
n
(−1)n
n
determined by
the alternating sequence (−1)
n
n
. We will refer to such a sequence as a
‘Leibniz sequence’ for the purposes of this subsection. This criterion
seems to be quantifying over sequences (and therefore sets), thus tran-
scending the FOL framework, but in fact this can be handled easily by
introducing a free variable that can be interpreted later according to
the chosen domain of discourse.
Thus, the criterion fits squarely within the parameters of FOL +
 at level (3) (see Section 3). In more detail, we are not interested
here in arbitrary ‘Leibniz sequences’ with possibly inassignable terms.
Leibniz only dealt with sequences with ordinary (assignable) terms, as
in the two examples given above. Each real sequence is handled in the
framework R ⊂ ∗R by the transfer principle, which asserts the validity
of each true relation when interpreted over ∗R.
2.3. Product rule. We have d(uv)
dx
= du
dx
v + dv
dx
u and it looks like we
need quantification over pairs of functions (u, v). Here again we are
only interested in natural extensions of real functions u, v, which are
handled at level (3) as in the previous section.
In [Leibniz 1684], the product rule is expressed in terms of differen-
tials as d(uv) = udv + vdu. In Cum Prodiisset [Leibniz 1701c, p. 46-
47], Leibniz presents an alternative justification of the product rule (see
[Bos 1974, p. 58]). Here he divides by dx and argues with differential
quotients rather than differentials. Adjusting Leibniz’s notation, we
obtain an equivalent calculation
d(uv)
dx
=
(u+ du)(v + dv)− uv
dx
=
udv + vdu+ du dv
dx
=
udv + vdu
dx
+
du dv
dx
=
udv + vdu
dx
.
Under suitable conditions the term du dv
dx
is infinitesimal, and therefore
the last step
udv + vdu
dx
+
du dv
dx
= u
dv
dx
+ v
du
dx
, (2.1)
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relying on a generalized notion of equality, is legitimized as an instance
of Leibniz’s transcendental law of homogeneity, which authorizes one
to discard the higher-order terms in an expression containing infinites-
imals of different orders.
2.4. Law of continuity. Leibniz proposed a heuristic principle known
as the law of continuity to the effect that
. . . et il se trouve que les re`gles du fini re´ussissent
dans l’infini . . . ; et que vice versa les re`gles de l’infini
re´ussissent dans le fini, . . . [Leibniz 1702a, p. 93-94],
cited by [Knobloch 2002, p. 67], [Robinson 1966, p. 262], [Laugwitz 1992,
p. 145], and other scholars.
On the face of it, one can find numerous counterexamples to such
a principle. Thus, finite ordinal number addition is commutative,
whereas for infinite ordinal numbers, the addition is no longer com-
mutative: 1 + ω = ω 6= ω + 1. Thus, the infinite realm of Cantor’s
ordinals differs significantly from the finite: in the finite realm, com-
mutativity rules, whereas in the infinite, it does not not. Thus the
transfer of properties between these two realms fails.
Similarly, there are many infinitary frameworks where the law of con-
tinuity fails to hold. For example, consider the Conway–Alling surreal
framework; see e.g., [Alling 1985]. Here one can’t extend even such an
elementary function as sin(x) from R to the surreals. Even more strik-
ingly,
√
2 turns out to be (sur)rational; see [Conway 2001, chapter 4].
The surnaturals don’t satisfy the Peano Arithmetic. Therefore transfer
from the finite to the infinite domain fails also for the domain of the
surreals.
On the other hand, the combined insight of [Hewitt 1948], [ Los´ 1955],
and [Robinson 1961] was that there does exist an infinitary framework
where the law of continuity can be interpreted in a meaningful fashion.
This is the R ⊂ ∗R framework. While it is not much of a novelty that
many infinitary systems don’t obey a law of continuity/transfer, the
novelty is that there is one that does, as shown by Hewitt,  Los´, and
Robinson, in the context of first-order logic.
Throughout the 18th century, Euler and other mathematicians re-
lied on a broad interpretation of the law of continuity or, as Cauchy
will call it, the generality of algebra. This involved manipulation of
infinite series as if they were finite sums, and in some cases it also
involved ignoring the fact that the series diverges. The first serious
challenge to this principle emerged from the study of Fourier series
when new types of functions arose through the summation thereof.
Specifically, Cauchy rejected the principle of the generality of algebra,
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and held that a series is only meaningful in its radius of convergence.
Cauchy’s approach was revolutionary at the time and immediately at-
tracted followers like Abel. Cauchy in 1821 was perhaps the first to
challenge such a broad interpretation of the law of continuity, with
a possible exception of Bolzano, whose work dates from only a few
years earlier and did not become widely known until nearly half a cen-
tury later. For additional details on Cauchy see [Katz & Katz 2011],
[Katz & Katz 2012], [Borovik & Katz 2012], [Bascelli et al. 2014]. For
Euler see [Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015] and [Bascelli et al. 2016].
2.5. Non-examples: EVT and IVT. It may be useful to illustrate
the scope of the relevant results by including a negative example. Con-
cerning results such as the extreme value theorem (EVT) and the in-
termediate value theorem (IVT), one notices that the proofs involve
procedures that are not easily encoded in first order logic. These 19th
century results (due to suitable combinations of Bolzano, Cauchy, and
Weierstrass) arguably fall outside the scope of Leibnizian calculus, as
do infinitesimal foundations for differential geometry as developed in
[Nowik & Katz 2015], [Kanovei, Katz & Nowik 2016].
There are axioms in FOL for a real closed field F (e.g., real alge-
braic numbers, real numbers, hyperreal numbers, Conway numbers).
One of these axioms formalizes the fact that IVT holds for odd de-
gree polynomials F [x]. In fact, one needs infinitely many axioms
like (∀a, b, c)(∃x)[x3 + ax2 + bx + c = 0]. Meanwhile, IVT in its
full form is equivalent to the continuity axiom for the real numbers
[B laszczyk 2015].
3. What does “first-order” mean exactly?
The adjective ‘first-order’ as we use it entails limitations on quan-
tification over sets (as opposed to elements). Now Leibniz really did
not have much to say about properties of sets in general in the con-
text of his infinitesimal calculus, and even declared on occasion that
infinite totalities don’t exist, as mentioned above. Note that Leibniz
arguably did exploit second-order logic in areas outside infinitesimal
calculus (see [Lenzen 1987], [Lenzen 2004]) but this will not be our
concern here. Leibniz famously takes for granted second order logic in
formulating his principle governing the identity of indiscernibles. While
second order logic is possibly part of Leibniz’s metaphysics it is not in
any obvious way part of his infinitesimal calculus.
Once we reach topics like Baire category, measure theory, Lebesgue
integration, and modern functional analysis, quantification over sets
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becomes important, but these were not Leibnizian concerns in the kind
of analysis he explored.
In fact, the term “first order logic” has several meanings. We can
distinguish three levels at which a number system could have first-
order properties compatible with those of the real numbers. Note that
the real numbers satisfy the axioms of an ordered field as well as a
completeness axiom.
(1) An ordered field obeys those among the usual axioms of the real
number system that can be stated in first-order logic (complete-
ness is excluded). For example, the following commutativity
axiom holds: (∀x, y) [x+ y = y + x].
(2) A real closed ordered field has all the first-order properties of
the real number system, regardless of whether such properties
are usually taken as axiomatic, for statements which involve
the basic ordered-field relations +,×, and ≤. This is a stronger
condition than obeying the ordered-field axioms. More specifi-
cally, one includes additional first-order properties, such as ex-
traction of roots (e.g., existence of a root for every odd-degree
polynomial). For example, every number must have a cube
root: (∀x)(∃y) [y3 = x], or every positive number have a square
root: (∀x > 0)(∃y) [y2 = x].
(3) The system could have all the first-order properties of the real
number system for statements involving arbitrary relations (re-
gardless of whether those relations can be expressed using +,×,
and ≤). For example, there would have to be a sine function
that is well defined for infinitesimal and infinite inputs; the same
is true for every real function. To do series, one needs a symbol
for N, so as to define transcendental entities such as π or sine.
We also introduce function symbols for whatever functions we
are interested in working with; say all elementary functions oc-
curring in Leibniz as well as their combinations via composition,
differentiation, and integration.
It follows from these examples that the first order qualification is
connected with the intended domain of discourse, so that any quantifier
related to objects outside the domain of discourse is qualified as not a
first order one. It could be added however that all mathematical objects
are, generally speaking, (represented by suitable) sets from the set
theoretic standpoint, and hence all mathematical quantifiers are first-
order with respect to the background set universe (superstructure).
The point with level (3) is that instead of quantifying over sequences
or functions, we relate to each individual sequence or function, and
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make sure that it has an analogue in the extended domain. Such an
analogue of f is sometimes referred to as the natural extension of f .
Then we can say something about the extension of every standard
object in our system, e.g., function, without ever being able to assert
anything about all functions. Thus, the product rule for differentiation
is proved for the assortment of functions chosen in item (3) above.
Remark 3.1. An alternative to the multitude of functional symbols
would be to add a countable list of variables u, v, w, . . . meant to de-
note unspecified functions. The idea is to avoid quantifying over such
variables, and use them as merely free variables. Then, for example,
the product rule is the following statement: “if u, v are differentiable
functions then the Leibniz rule holds for u and v”, with u, v being free
variables.
Note that we use FOL in a different sense from that used in formal-
izing Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC).
When we seek hyperreal proxies, following the pioneering work of
[Hewitt 1948] and [Robinson 1966], for Leibniz’s procedural moves, the
theory of real closed fields at level (2) is insufficient and we must rely
upon level (3).
Thus, Leibniz’s series of Subsection 2.1 is expressible in FOL + 
at level (3) but FOL level (2) does not suffice since π is not algebraic.
Similarly, examples in Subsection 2.2 and Subsection 2.3 need symbols
for unspecified functions which are not available at level (2).
4. Modern frameworks
Based on the examples of Section 2, we would like to consider the
following question:
Which modern mathematical framework is the most ap-
propriate for interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calcu-
lus?
The frameworks we would like to consider are
(A) a Weierstrassian (or “epsilontic”) framework in the context of
what has been called since [Stolz 1883] an Archimedean con-
tinuum, satisfying Euclid V.4 (see Section 2), namely the real
numbers exclusively; and
(B) a modern framework exploiting infinitesimals such as the hy-
perreals, which could be termed a Bernoullian continuum since
Johann Bernoulli was the first to exploit infinitesimals (rather
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than “exhaustion” methods) systematically in developing the
calculus.1
The series summation blackbox  (see Subsection 2.1) is handled dif-
ferently in A and B. Framework A exploits a first-order “epsilontic”
formulation that works in a complete Archimedean field. Thus, the
convergence of a series
∑
i
ui to L would be expressed as follows:
(∀ǫ > 0)(∃n ∈ N)(∀m ∈ N)
[
m ≥ n→
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
ui − L
∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ
]
.
[Ishiguro 1990, Chapter 5] sought to interpret Leibnizian infinitesimal
calculus by means of such quantified paraphrases, having apparently
overlooked Leibniz’s remarks to the effect that his infinitesimals violate
Euclid V.4 [Leibniz 1695b, p. 322].
Meanwhile, framework B allows for an alternative interpretation in
terms of the shadow (i.e., the standard part, closely related to Leibniz’s
generalized notion of equality) and hyperfinite partial sums as follows:
for each infinite hypernatural H the partial sum
∑
H
i=1 ui is infinitely
close to L, i.e.,
(∀H)
[
H infinite →
H∑
i=1
ui ≈ L
]
.
This is closer to the historical occurrences of the package  as found
in Gregory, Leibniz, and Euler, as we argue below.
In pursuing modern interpretations of Leibniz’s work, a helpful dis-
tinction is that between ontological and procedural issues. More specif-
ically, we seek to sidestep traditional questions concerning the ontology
of mathematical entities such as numbers, and concentrate instead on
the procedures, in line with Quine’s comment to the effect that
Arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to number: there
is no saying absolutely what the numbers are; there is
only arithmetic. [Quine 1968, p. 198]
1The adjective non-Archimedean is used in modern mathematics to refer to cer-
tain modern theories of ordered number systems properly extending the real num-
bers, namely various successors of [Hahn 1907]. In modern mathematics, this ad-
jective tends to evoke associations unrelated to 17th century mathematics. Further-
more, defining infinitesimal mathematics by a negation, i.e., as non-Archimedean,
is a surrender to the Cantor–Dedekind–Weierstrass (CDW) view. Meanwhile, true
infinitesimal calculus as practiced by Leibniz, Bernoulli, and others is the base
of reference as far as 17th century mathematics is concerned. The CDW system
could be referred to as non-Bernoullian, though the latter term has not yet gained
currency.
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Related comments can be found in [Benacerraf 1965]. If one could
separate the “ontological questions” from the rest, then framework A
would be more appropriate than framework B for interpreting the clas-
sical texts if and only if framework A provides better proxies for the
procedural moves found in Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than frame-
work B does, and vice versa.
The tempting evidence in favor of the appropriateness of a mod-
ern framework B for interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus is
the presence of infinitesimals and infinite numbers in both, as well
as the availability of hyperreal proxies for guiding principles in Leib-
niz’s work such as the law of continuity as expressed in [Leibniz 1701c]
and [Leibniz 1702a] as well as the transcendental law of homogene-
ity [Leibniz 1710b]; see [Katz & Sherry 2012], [Katz & Sherry 2013],
[Sherry & Katz 2014], [Guillaume 2014]. To what extent Leibnizian in-
finitesimals can be implemented in differential geometry can be gauged
from [Nowik & Katz 2015].
The question we seek to explore is whether the limitation of work-
ing with first order logic as discussed in Section 3 could potentially
undermine a full implementation of a hyperreal scheme for Leibnizian
infinitesimal calculus.
With this in mind, let us consider Skolem’s construction of nonstan-
dard natural numbers [Skolem 1933], [Skolem 1934], [Skolem 1955]; see
[Kanovei et al. 2013, section 3.2] for additional references. It turns out
that one needs many, many nonstandard numbers in order to move
from N to ∗N, e.g., in Henkin’s countable model one has
∗N = N+ (Z×Q). (4.1)
Here we use Q to indicate that the galaxies are dense, so that between
any pair of galaxies there is another galaxy (a galaxy is the set of
numbers at finite distance from each other). Meanwhile Z indicates
that each galaxy other than the original N itself is order-isomorphic
to Z rather than to N, because for each infinite H the number H − 1
is in the same galaxy.
Leibniz arguably did not have such a perspective. In other words,
one needs to build up a considerable conceptual machinery to emulate
Leibniz’s probably rather modest arsenal of procedural moves. That is
to say, we may be able to emulate all of Leibniz moves in a modern B-
framework, such as Leibniz’s infinite quantities, his distinction between
assignable and inassignable quantities, and his transcendental law of
homogeneity. However, the B-framework also enables us to carry out
many additional moves unknown to Leibniz, for instance those related
to the detailed structure of ∗N as in (4.1). Thus, the difference between
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the Leibnizian framework and a modern infinitesimal B-framework is
large.
On the other hand, a Weierstrassian A-framework may not cover
all the moves Leibniz may make in his framework LEI, but one might
argue that the difference between (A) and LEI is small. Thus, one
may not necessarily have LEI ⊆ (A), but one might argue that the
difference (A)− LEI is small. This may be taken as evidence that (A)
and LEI are more similar to each other than (B) and LEI are. This
could affect the assessment of appropriateness. Finally, could it be
that neither the Weierstrassian nor the modern infinitesimal account
is appropriate to cope with Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus?
5. Separating entities from procedures
What would it mean exactly to separate ontological problems from
procedural problems? A possible approach is to attempt to account
for Leibniz’s procedures in a framework limited to first order logic,
with a small number of additional ingredients such as the relation of
infinite proximity and the closely related shadow principle for passing
from a finite inassignable quantity to an assignable one (or from a finite
nonstandard number to a standard one), as in 2x+ dx pq 2x.
2
As far as Skolem’s nonstandard extension N ⊂ ∗N is concerned,
anything involving the actual construction of the number system and
the entities called numbers would go under the heading of the ontology
of mathematical entities. Note that the first order theories of N and ∗N
are identical, as shown by Skolem (for more details see Section 3). In
this sense, not only is one not adding a lot, but in fact one is not adding
anything at all at the level of the theory.
What about the claim that Leibniz did not have this perspective?
It is true that he did not have our perspective on the ontological is-
sues involved in a modern construction of a suitable number system
incorporating infinite numbers, but this needn’t affect the procedural
match.
What about the claim that one has to build up a considerable con-
ceptual machinery to emulate Leibniz’s probably rather modest arsenal
of procedural moves; that is to say, we may be able to emulate all of
Leibniz’s moves in the modern framework, but it also enables us to
2On occasion Leibniz used the notation “ pq ” for the relation of equality. Note
that Leibniz also used our “=” and other signs for equality, and did not distinguish
between “=” and “ pq ” in this regard. To emphasize the special meaning equality
had for Leibniz, it may be helpful to use the symbol pq so as to distinguish Leibniz’s
equality in a generalized sense of “up to” from the modern notion of equality “on
the nose.”
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carry out many moves that Leibniz would have never dreamt of ? As
mentioned above, this is not the case at the level of first order logic.
What about the claim that the difference between Leibniz framework
and the infinitesimal framework is large? At the procedural level this
is arguably not the case.
What about the claim that the Weierstrass framework may not cover
all of Leibniz’s, but the difference, (A)− LEI, is small, indicating that
(A) and LEI are more similar to each other than (B) and LEI are,
affecting the assessment of appropriateness? What needs to be pointed
out here is that actually the considerable distance in ontology between
(A) and LEI is about the same is the distance between (B) and LEI. The
Weierstrassian punctiform continuum where almost all real numbers
are undefinable (so that no individual number of this sort can ever be
specified, unlike π, e, etc.) is a far cry from anything one might have
imagined in the 17th century.
As far as the question Could it be that neither Weierstrass nor the in-
finitesimal account is appropriate to cope with Leibniz? this is of course
possible in principle. However, we are interested here in the practical
issue of modern commentators missing some compelling aspects of in-
terpretation of Leibniz’s work because of a self-imposed limitation to
a Weierstrassian interpretive framework.
6. A lid on ontology
It could be objected that one cannot escape so easily with the general
argument along the lines of “Let’s Ignore (ontological) Differences,” or
LID for short (putting a lid on ontology, so to speak).
The LID proceeds as follows. We start with the ‘real’ L, i.e., the
mathematician who lived, wrote, and argued in the 17th century. It
seems plausible to assume that L based his reasoning on a mixture of
first and second order arguments, without clearly differentiating be-
tween the two.
In a reconstruction of L’s arguments, one replaces the cognitive
agent L by a substitute L1 who argues only in a first order frame-
work. This entails, in particular, that L1 cannot distinguish between N
and ∗N.
However, it seems likely that L could distinguish the two structures,
simply because he did not distinguish between the first and second
order levels. In other words, the LID recommendation does not help
because the distinction between first and second order does not only
affect the ontology but also the epistemology of the historical agents
involved.
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In sum, a modern infinitesimal reconstruction of L deals with a first-
order version of L, namely L1, and not with L. In line with his posi-
tion on geometric algebra, [Unguru 1976] could point out that L1 is
a modern artefact, different from the “real” L. Therefore additional
arguments are needed in favor of the hypothesis that L and L1 are
epistemologically sufficiently similar, but this seems difficult. In any
case, a purely ontological assumption does not suffice.
To respond to the L vs L1 distinction, note that the tools one needs
are almost limited to first order logic, but not quite, since one needs
the shadow principle and the relation of infinite proximity. Rather than
arguing that L = L1, we are arguing that L = L1 + ǫ.
Now the difference between calculus and analysis is that in calculus
one deals mostly with first order phenomena (with the proviso as in
Section 5), whereas in analysis one starts tackling phenomena that
are essentially second order, such as the completeness property i.e.,
existence of the least upper bound for an arbitrary bounded set, etc.
It seems reasonable to assume that what they were doing in the 17th
century was calculus rather than analysis.
As far as Unguru is concerned, he is unlikely to be impressed by in-
terpretations of Leibnizian infinitesimals as quantified propositions or
for that matter by reading Leibniz as if he had already read not only
Weierstrass but also Russell a` la Ishiguro, contrary to much textual ev-
idence in Leibniz himself. We provide a rebuttal of the Ishiguro–Arthur
logical fiction reading in [Bair et al. 2016] and [Bascelli et al. 2016].
7. Robinson, Cassirer, Nelson
7.1. Robinson on second-order logic. The following quote is from
Robinson’s Non-standard Analysis :
The axiomatic systems for many algebraic concepts such
as groups or fields are formulated in a natural way within
a first order language. . . , However, interesting parts of
the theory of such a concept may well extend beyond
the resources of a first order language. Thus, in the
theory of groups statements regarding subgroups, or re-
garding the existence of subgroups of certain types will,
in general, involve quantification with respect to sets of
individuals. . . [Robinson 1966, section 2.6, p. 19]
This appears to amount to a claim that the local ontology may indeed
be often formulated in first-order terms, while the global ontology is
deeply infected by second-order concepts. The latter may typically
involve objects and arguments qualified as second or higher order with
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respect to the former, which nevertheless are of the first-order type
when considered as related to the background set universe.
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7.2. Ernst Cassirer. Does the equation L = L1+ ǫ not amount to an
underestimation of the historical Leibniz? Is it reasonable to assume
that he only invented the calculus, and not analysis? According to
Cassirer, the basic concepts of analysis were deeply soaked with phi-
losophy, i.e., for Leibniz mathematical and philosophical concepts were
intimately related:3
Leibniz himself asserted that the new analysis has sprung
from the innermost source of philosophy, and he assigned
to both regions [i.e., analysis and philosophy] the task
to confirm and to elucidate each other.4 [Cassirer 1902,
p. xi]
If L = L1 + epsilon, i.e., if the historical Leibniz was mainly deal-
ing with calculus, this may appear hardly compatible with Cassirer’s
perspective; see [Mormann & Katz 2013]. This impression would be,
however, a misunderstanding. In order to forestall it, it merits be-
ing pointed out that developing the calculus was a great mathematical
achievement of philosophical relevance. It is only today that the term
calculus possesses a connotation of routine undergraduate mathemat-
ics, but not in the 19th century.
As far as Cassirer is concerned, Leibniz was indeed doing analysis as
l’Hoˆpital called it. It is not even sure Cassirer was aware of the more
advanced analysis. Leibnizian calculus only seems “trivial” from the
standpoint of properly 20th century mathematics. It is an advance in
understanding when we make a distinction between Leibnizian calculus
and analysis. We don’t mean to diminish Leibniz’s greatness by this
distinction, nor do we suggest that Cassirer was wrong. He was merely
using the term analysis in its 17–19th century sense rather than the
sense in which we use it today.
7.3. Edward Nelson. As far as the passage from [Robinson 1966] is
concerned, we find the following comment at the end of the paragraph:
The following framework for higher order structures and
higher order languages copes with these and similar cases.
It is rather straightforward and suitable for our pur-
poses. [Robinson 1966, section 2.6, p. 19]
3In support of this claim, Cassirer refers here in particular to Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, hrg. von Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, 7 Bde.,
Berlin 1875–1890, Bd. VII, S. 542. (Cassirer 1902, p. xi)
4In the original: “Leibniz selbst hat es ausgesprochen, daß die neue Analysis aus
dem innersten Quell der Philosophie geflossen ist, und beiden Gebieten die Aufgabe
zugewiesen, sich wechselseitig zu besta¨tigen und zu erhellen.”
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Robinson then proceeds to develop a solution, which roughly corre-
sponds to level (3) as outlined in Section 3. The claim that we are
dealing with first order logic plus standard part is in a sense a mathe-
matical theorem, undermining the contention that “this seems hardly
compatible, etc.”
Edward Nelson demonstrated that infinitesimals can be found within
the ordinary real line itself in the following sense. Nelson finds infinites-
imals in the real line by means of enriching the language through the
introduction of a unary predicate standard and an axiom schemata (of
Idealization), one of most immediate instances of which implies the ex-
istence of infinitely large integers and hence nonzero infinitesimals; see
[Nelson 1977]. This is closely parallel to the dichotomy of assignable
vs inassignable in Leibniz, whereas Carnot spoke of quantite´s de´signe´es
[Carnot 1797], [Barreau 1989, p. 46]. Thus, we obtain infinitesimals as
soon as we assume that (1) there are assignable (or standard) reals,
that obey the same rules as all the reals, and (2) there are reals that
not assignable.
In more detail, one considers the ordinary ZFC formulated in first
order logic (here the term is used in a different sense from the rest of
this article), adds to it the unary predicate and the axiom schemata,
and obtains a framework where calculus and analysis can be done with
infinitesimals. For further discussion see [Katz & Kutateladze 2015].
The passage from Robinson cited above does indicate that second
order theory may often be interesting. However, in the case of the
calculus/analysis as it was practiced in the 17th century, we are not
aware of a single significant result that cannot be formulated in a sys-
tem of type FOL + (see Section 2 for examples of results that can).
Arguably it was calculus (rather than analysis) that Leibniz invented,
in the sense that there don’t appear to be any essentially second order
statements there.
It may seem surprising that there could be a kind of pre-established
harmony between a modern logical category, namely, first-order results,
and a historical category, namely, results of 17th century calculus. This
idea suggests further questions: does this only hold for the calculus, or
is it always or often the case that a historically earlier realization of a
theory covers only the first-order part of its successor. How do arith-
metic and geometry behave in this respect? Would it really make sense
to systematically distinguish between Leibniz and Leibniz1, Euclid and
Euclid1, etc.?
16 P.B., V. K., K. K., M. K., T. K., T. M., AND D. S.
7.4. Not standalone. Let us return to the comment In the context
of Skolem’s construction of nonstandard natural numbers and some re-
lated stuff, one is impressed by how many nonstandard numbers one
needs to move from N to ∗N, e.g., in Henkin’s model ∗N = N+(Z×Q)
and it goes without saying that Leibniz did not have this perspective,
that was addressed briefly above. One could elaborate on the “im-
pression” concerning “how many nonstandard numbers” one needs to
define ∗N consistently and conveniently.
An infinitely large number say H is not a standalone object, but
rather lives in a community of numbers obeying certain laws which
mathematicians anticipate as a goal of the construction of a nonstan-
dard number system ∗N. Such a commitment to anticipated laws forces
Skolem and others to add to N a suitable entourage of H along with H
itself. What are the laws involved?
Modern specialists in Nonstandard Analysis (NSA) stipulate that ∗N
should satisfy the axioms of Peano Arithmetic and moreover, satisfy
the same sentences of the language (not necessarily consequences of
the axioms) that are true in N itself. This is called (the principle of)
Transfer today. Mathematicians of the 17th (or even 19th) century had
neither this perspective nor the tools consistently to define ∗N or ∗R.
On the other hand, one can argue that there is no need for actu-
ally rigorously defining ∗N in order to make use of its benefits. One
can argue that it is sufficient to have some idea of Transfer on top
of an acceptance of infinitely large numbers per se (possibly as use-
ful fictions, to borrow Leibniz’s expression). We have argued that the
Leibnizian Law of continuity is closely related to the Transfer principle;
see [Katz & Sherry 2013].
Therefore the claim that Leibniz had not the slightest idea of this stuff
(the “stuff” being the modern technique of building nonstandard mod-
els) is perhaps technically true, but it does not reflect all the aspects
of the interrelations within the Leibniz/Weierstrass/NSA triangle.
8. Conclusion
The vast oeuvre of Leibniz is still in the process of publication. In
principle a lucky scholar might one day unearth a manuscript where
Leibniz tackles a property equivalent to the completeness of the reals
(after all the existence of the shadow is so equivalent), involving quan-
tification over all sets of the number system and therefore second-order.
However, this is unlikely in view of Leibniz’s reluctance to deal with
infinite collections, as mentioned above. If level (3) of first order logic is
indeed suitable for developing modern proxies for the inferential moves
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found in Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus, as we have argued, then
modern infinitesimal frameworks are more appropriate to interpreting
Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than modern Weierstrassian ones.
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